

2 October 1964

The Honorable Brockway McMillan
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear Brock:

This replies to your letter of September 30th recommending the establishment of a small committee to look into the radar cross section of the OXCART airplane.



In view of the importance of this study, I am making Mr. John Parangosky, the Deputy for Technology in the Office of Special Activities which is responsible for Program B, available on a full-time basis to the committee to handle all the detailed arrangements for travel and meetings. Mr. Parangosky is thoroughly familiar with all of the prior studies on this matter as well as with the personnel involved.

It should therefore not be necessary to assign an additional member from the NRO Staff to make these arrangements and otherwise service the committee. If the need for military aircraft should arise, and certainly this would be a great convenience, it would be most helpful if you could lay one on. I don't know how you are fixed for travel funds in the NRO budget but if this is any problem at all, we can fund it within NRO funds already made available to the Agency or from Agency funds direct.

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I consider it preferable to limit the scope of the committee to the four questions you enumerated in your letter and to the overall problem of radar cross section and improvements therein. This is one facet of the overall problem of vulnerability in which members of the committee are recognized experts. The many other facets such as enemy air defense deployments, operational planning for missions, deception procedures before and during missions, electronic counter-measures, and additional factors not listed which make up a total vulnerability study, should not be charged to this committee. However, they should have available any and all reviews on the radar cross section problem that are available from all the agencies and contractors who have a hand in this problem.

should render a written report to you as Director, NRO, with copies to Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Pat

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

MSC:blp/blh

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

September 30, 1964

Dear Pat,

This letter amplifies on one matter raised during our conversation with Mr. Vance on 29 September.

It has been known for some time that the radar cross-section of the OXCART airplane exceeds considerably the cross-section hoped for early in the program. Recent analyses of vulnerability have I believe used data determined from the current configuration. Before these analyses are accepted as describing the best that can be accomplished, it would be prudent to examine carefully the present data on radar cross-section, and to consider the following questions:

1. Are there specific identifiable causes of the increase in cross-section over the original objectives?
2. Would it be possible to correct these difficulties, and what corrective actions would be required?
3. Could enough improvement be expected from corrective actions that they would be desirable to undertake, even if accomplished on only two or a few aircraft, depending on the extent of the changes involved?
4. Are there further measurements and tests that are needed to assist in the answering of these questions?



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25X1 I would like to institute such a committee under Professor [redacted] chairmanship. I solicit CIA suggestions for possible members. Professor [redacted] is very busy, and would undertake

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this review at considerable personal inconvenience. From my discussion with him, I believe that the committee should be kept small. Certainly its membership should fully be agreed to by him.



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A member of the (S) NRO staff can handle necessary detailed arrangements for travel and meetings.

Please let me know if you concur in the establishment of such a committee, with any nominations for possible members.

Sincerely,



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Brockway McMillan
Director
(S) National Reconnaissance Office

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency

cc - Dep Sec of Defense

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